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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this research paper is to analyze the Renminbi (the Chinese currency), suggesting 
whether or not the currency should be allowed to float.  The paper makes the use of four popular 
approaches to determine whether or not the currency is currently undervalued, and if so, what 
mechanisms should be used to allow for its proper valuation.  According to the purchasing power 
parity (PPP), balance of payments approach, and the asset management approach, the Chinese 
currency is undervalued and will therefore appreciate in the future.  For the long run, the floating of 
the currency is advisable; however, in the short run, it will not be in the best interest of the Chinese 
economy given the nature of its banking system.  Adopting a pure float could possibly cause major 
macro and micro economic imbalances that would be difficult to tackle.  Instead, suggesting the 
pegging of the Renminbi against a basket of currencies to ensure system wide flexibility and stability 
is the best course of action. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
hina‟s economic performance this past decade helped propel its stature amongst the emerging market 
economies as one of the fastest growing economies with nearly double-digit, real-GDP, growth rates.  As 
a result of the Chinese government‟s launching of economic reforms since the 1970‟s that made the 
country more open for international business, the Chinese government and the Central Bank have been practicing a 
fixed-exchange rate by pegging the Renminbi to the U.S. Dollar.  
 
Although there were several phases in the modification of the Chinese exchange rate policies in the period 
ranging 1979-2006, the most major characteristic of them all was the strong government influence on the foreign 
exchange regime and fixed exchange rate policy.  China consistently utilized the exchange rate policy as a tool for 
achieving internal stability, ultimately promoting its export and economic growth.  
 
In 2005, China changed its exchange-rate policy by fixing the Renminbi to a basket of currencies that 
consisted of the U.S. Dollar (USD), Japanese Yen (YEN), and the Hong Kong Dollar (HKD)
1
.  Nevertheless, this new 
currency policy has not significantly changed the relationship between the Renminbi and other basket currencies in 
terms of Renminbi value.  More notably, China has not shared their complete list of basket currencies with relative 
weights; thus hiding any further indication as to the remaining presence of the Central Bank‟s direct influence on the 
Renminbi‟s exchange rate.  
 
The central issue grasping the attention of macroeconomists and China‟s major trading partners is whether China 
should change its dominantly fixed exchange rate regime towards a more flexible policy that would better reflect the 
market conditions, therefore establishing a more realistic value of the Renminbi.  The underlying argument 
asseverates the fact that China persistently maintains an undervalued Renminbi currency to create a large external 
imbalance whose repercussions on the stability of the global economy affect the world‟s largest economies, most 
                                                 
1 “China on Thursday took an important step forward in its move toward a market economy, announcing it would increase the 
value of its currency, the yuan, and abandon its decade-old fixed exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in favor of a link to a basket of 
world currencies.” – Washington Post Foreign Service: “China Ends Fixed-Rate Currency”. Peter S. Goodman, July 22, 2005 
C 
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notably, the United States, Japan, and the European Union.  The great irony of course is the fact that these three 
economic powers are China‟s major trading and investment partners.  
 
The paper will also give a brief, historic outline of the Renminbi exchange rates in addition to analyzing 
China‟s fundamental, macroeconomic indicators (i.e., GDP, BOP, inflation, interest rates, and unemployment).  In 
addition, China‟s political environment will be analyzed being that it directly affects the behavior of the 
macroeconomic indicators, which in turn, further impact the Renminbi‟s exchange rate.  The objective is to evaluate 
China‟s ability and benefits it can posses in maintaining a fixed exchange rates versus shifting it toward a floating 
regime.  
 
THE RENMINBI EXCHANGE RATE 
 
The Renminbi‟s exchange rate policy has long served as a dispute between China and its major trading 
partners who believe that China has been artificially maintaining its depreciated exchange rate in order to further boost 
exports.  The undervalued currency along with increased productivity coupled with relatively inexpensive labor that 
make China‟s manufacturers more competitive related to its major trading partners are considered to be additional 
factors affecting exchange rate policy.  Some analyses suggest that this situation led to a higher trade imbalance and 
larger trade deficit in some of the leading world economies, specifically the United States.   
 
There have been several modifications in China‟s exchange rate regime after it had initiated its transition 
toward a more economically open society in 1979
2
.  During the period of 1979-1993, China had utilized its exchange 
rate as a tool for financial planning within its planned economy.  This period characterized a fixed exchange rate 
policy pegged to the USD.  In this period, the Renminbi had been gradually devaluated in order to meet the needs of 
desired economic growth.  The official integration of the Renminbi exchange rate and foreign exchange swap rates of 
1994-1997 changed the exchange rate regime into a “managed float system”.  Immediately upon this integration, the 
official exchange rate was lowered to 33.3%.  
 
The rate integration and transition to a managed float regime reversed the trend.  As a result, the Renminbi 
started to slightly appreciate vis-à-vis the USD during the three-year period of 1994 to 1997.  During the period of 
1998-2004, the Asian crises had affected the general capital outflow from the region.  There were expectations that the 
Renminbi would devalue. Nevertheless, the Chinese government intervened and refused to devaluate the Renminbi, 
keeping it at the fixed level pegged to the USD.  Throughout this time, the Chinese government maintained a tight 
control of the Renminbi‟s value according to the objectives of its economic policy.  To this day, preserving internal 
stability and utilizing exchange rate policy in order to support its export activities have consistently been major goals 
of the Chinese government. 
 
The most recent policy modification occurred in August 2005 by pegging the Renminbi to a basket of 
currencies.  The Central Bank of China called the currently modified, exchange rate arrangement a “managed float 
system” 3.  The People's Bank of China (PBC) quotes spot rates of the Renminbi (RMB) against a basket of currencies 
(which include the USD, YEN, and HKD) on a daily basis.  The rates are calculated as a weighted average of 
exchange rates at which transactions are made at the PBC's Shanghai Foreign Exchange Trade Center.  The Chinese 
government is reluctant to publish a complete list of the currencies it takes into the basket.  Exchange rates of the 
RMB against other foreign currencies are calculated by commercial banks based on the cross-rates between rates of 
RMB against the USD, and USD rates against other currencies in international markets.  The exchange rates are 
expressed in RMB per 100 foreign currency units.  The table below shows a sample of the historical exchange rate of 
the RMB compared to currencies that serve as a basket.  
 
 
                                                 
2 “The Evolution of the Renminbi Exchange”, Asian Development Bank Institute. Tokyo, Japan. (May 6, 2006)  
3“Under the rules introduced in July, the renminbi can only deviate by up to 0.3 per cent against the dollar each day. The closing fix 
on each day automatically became the new opening price on the following trading day.” – Financial Times: “Renminbi Expected to 
Rise After New Trading Rules”. Steve Johnson, January 5, 2006 
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Date USD JPY HKD EUR 
1/1/2002 0.1210 15.929 0.9433 0.1357 
1/1/2003 0.1210 14.3702 0.9433 0.1152 
1/1/2004 0.1210 12.9919 0.9394 0.09619 
1/1/2005 0.1210 12.3922 0.9404 0.08918 
1/1/2006 0.1239 14.5798 0.9607 0.1046 
1/1/2007 0.1282 15.2762 0.9977 0.09721 
Source: www.oanda.com 
 
 
In conclusion, in spite of the fact that the Chinese Government calls the new policy a “managed float”, a 
more detailed analysis of the relative macroeconomic indicators and currency movements indicates that their policy is 
still much more managed than floated.  Pegging the RMB to a basket of currencies (which lacks details regarding its 
composition and corresponding weights) leaves a large space for monetary authorities to affect currency movements 
in any desired direction.  The table below shows selected historic exchange rates between RMB and basket currencies.  
 
 
USD YEN HKD EUR
7/21/2005 0.121 13.6394 0.9409 0.09958
8/21/2005 0.1235 13.6497 0.9601 0.1017
9/21/2005 0.1238 13.8514 0.9606 0.1021
10/21/2005 0.1238 14.2877 0.9605 0.1031
11/21/2005 0.1239 14.7649 0.9606 0.1052
12/21/2005 0.1239 14.3829 0.9608 0.1032
1/21/2006 0.1241 14.3244 0.9624 0.1027
2/10/2006 0.1242 14.7245 0.9638 0.1037
Since the change to the basket of currencies
 
Source: www.oanda.com 
 
 
GDP AND ECONOMIC GROWTH OF CHINA 
 
China‟s rapid economic growth is in large part due to the economic reforms it had implemented in the late 
1970‟s.  In the 10-year period ranging from 1986 to 1996, the Chinese economy had achieved impressive economic 
growth of 10% annually on average (measured in real GDP terms).  This percentage slightly declined in the next 
decade to an average, annual growth of 8.4% in the subsequent 10-year period ranging from 1996 to 2006
4
.  
Nevertheless, China has still been the fastest growing economy in the world.  The results are even more impressive 
considering the currency crises that shook the whole region in that period through Asia‟s “tequila effect” in the mid to 
late 1990‟s.  In addition, some of the major economic powers in the world, along with other major Chinese trading 
partners, experienced a recession in the 2-year period ranging from 2001 to 2003.  An analysis of the Chinese 
macroeconomic indicators for this period, specifically GDP and trade balance, indicates that China was able to absorb 
these disruptions except for the slight decline in its GDP growth. (See the table bellow) 
 
China had gradually initiated reforms of its industries in the 1980‟s to shift them more toward market 
orientation, making them more competitive.  In the agricultural sector, reforms consisted of dismantling the commune 
system and introducing the household responsibility system that provided peasants greater decision-making in 
agricultural activities
5
. Manufacturing industries were mostly spured by attracting foreign investments that occurred in 
a variety of industrial and consumer goods.  With its abundant labor resources and more relaxed regualations related 
to foreign investments, China had attracted many powerful multi-national enterprises (MNE) that had begun to 
                                                 
4 International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys - “World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inflation.” 
April 2006 
5 Country Watch database 
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heavily invest in China, effectively utilizing the relatively inexpensive labor, gaining an access to this large market 
that showed indication of liberalization in the area of  business.  
 
One of the key drivers of Chinese economic growth was the export of goods.  China was the fourth largest 
trading nation with consistent, surplus growth in the trade balance.  In the last decade, China had a rapidly consistent, 
surplus growth in their current account and trade balance.  It is worth mentioning that more than 50% of Chinese 
export comes from foreign companies that have manufacturing operations in China.  This indicates that China has 
been able to improve the competitiveness of their industries, simultaneously attracting large capital inflows mostly 
through foreign direct investments (FDI). 
 
The major part of GDP is 48.1% industry based, which includes manufacturing and construction.  Services 
contribute approximately 40% while agriculture contributes to 11.9% of GDP (CIA estimate for 2006)
6
. The rapid 
economic growth of China in the last two decades has resulted in China being the second largest economy in the 
world in 2006 behind the U.S. (measured in terms of PPP)
7
.  Nevertheless, in per capita terms, China is still far behind 
most developed countries and it is still in a category of emerging economies with low middle incomes (based on 
World Bank classification).  The table on the following page clearly illustrates these discrepancies between high GDP 
growth and still very low per capita distribution. Over 10% of the population (or more than 150 million of the 
Chinese) lives below the poverty line
8
.   
 
Another significant problem for Chinese economic growth is a high disproportion between regional 
developments.  Most of the business activities that account for the majority of GDP occur in eastern, coastal provinces 
and in several major cities.  On the other hand, China has highly undeveloped and poor interior regions with masses of 
redundant labor that had been laid off from inefficient state owned enterprises that were liquidated as a result of 
Chinese economic reforms and an inflow of highly competitive MNE‟s.  The unbalanced economic growth and still 
high percentage of poor populations will represent the major challenge for the Chinese to further economic growth.  In 
addition, China still faces challenges to achieve higher efficiencies in certain sectors that are fundamental for 
sustainable economic growth. The banking sector is still not completely reformed and is burdened with high numbers 
of non-performing loans that strongly weakened the state-run banking system.  In addition, there are still large 
numbers of inefficient state-owned enterprises that hinder growth.  The tables below summarize the information 
regarding Chinese GDP growth. 
 
 
Period 1986-1996 1997-2006 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Real GDP 10 8.4 8.8 7.8 7.1 8 7.5 8.3 9.5 9.5 9 8.2
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005 
 
 
GDP growth
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1,494.45
1,298.85
1.151
Real Gross Domestic Product 
US $'s (billions of US dollars)
0.8505 0.9087 0.9758 1.059
Total Population in million 
persos 1,268.85 1,276.88 1,284.28 1,291.50
Real GDP Per Capita US$ 
(Thousands of US Dollars Per 
Person)
1,079.19 1,160.33 1,253.17 1,367.21
 
Source: Country Watch 
 
                                                 
6 The World Factbook – Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), United States of America. January 18, 2007 
7 World Bank PPP GDP 2006 
8 According to the Asian Development Bank, about 10.5 percent of the urban population and 25.5 percent of the rural population 
would be classified as poor in 1999. 
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BALANCE OF PAYMENT EFFECTS 
 
China had a consistently growing surplus in their current account balance during the 9-year period from 1997 
to 2006.  The surplus grew from $34.4 billion in 1997 to $115.6 billion in 2005.  Export growth remains to be the 
major driver of China‟s economic growth, being that is an area where China has become highy competitive.  China‟s 
major trading parners include Japan, EU, United States, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  According to U.S. 
statistics, China had a trade surplus with the U.S. of $124 billion in 2003.  This development of the Chinese export 
sector was supported by policies that fostered inflows of FDIs in the manufactoring sector.  Foreign invested 
manufacturers produce about half of China‟s exports. 
 
Competitive advantages in these manufacturing areas were a combination of several factors. First, the 
Chinese government had a clear strategy regarding which industries were to develop by gradually opening its space 
for foreign investments in those areas.  Second, consistent with the “Factor Proportion Theory” and “Factor Mobility 
Theory”, China utilized its abundant and relatively cheap labor to attract foreign investors.  At the end, China utlized 
its fixed exchange rate policy in order to set the Renminbi on a desired level to correspond with its economic policy 
objectives.     
 
Another aspect of the Chinese opnening up their economy to foreign investment was its integration into the 
world trading system.  China demonstrated its intentions to increase its participation in world trade by joining the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group in 1991.  APEC promotes free trade and cooperation in the realm 
of economics, trade, investment, and technology.  Additionally, China formally joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in December 2001.  In an effort to join the WTO, China agreed to lower tariffs and abolish market 
impediments.  The Chinese and foreigner investors gained the right to import and export on their own by selling their 
products without going through a government middleman.  The agreement also opened up new opportunities for 
international companies to invest in China with less complications, providing services like banking, insurance, and 
telecommunications.  Although China has made progress toward WTO requirenments, there are still certain issues 
related to protection of legal rights and piracy issues.  Another impediment for further growth of FDIs in China rests 
in the untransparent and inconsistent enforcement of laws that lacks any kind of an adequate legal infrastructure
9
. 
 
As part of its admission into the WTO in 2001, China made a commitment to eliminate certain trade-related 
investment measures by opening up specified sectors that had previously been closed to foreign investment.  New 
laws, regulations, and administrative measures to implement these commitments are now being issued.  Remaining 
barriers to foreign investment include opaque and inconsistently enforced laws and regulations, not to mention the 
lack of a rules-based, legal infrastructure.  Nevertherless, inspite of these problems, China has continued to be one of 
the largest recipients of FDIs in the world, receiving over $63 billion in 2006
10
, for a cumulative total over $500 
billion. 
 
 
Tade balance
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Exports (billions of US 
dollars)
Total Imports(billions of US 
dollars)
Trade Balance (billions of US 
dollars)(bi ions of US dollars) -460-224 -220.5 -279.4 -268.6
2,420.00
2,075.70 2,246.57 2,715.94 3,717.09 1,960.00
2,299.70 2,467.07 2,995.34 3,985.69
 
Source: Country watch 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 “Risks and Opportunities of a Rising China” – The Heritage Foundation. June 22, 2006 
10 “FDI in China Tops 63 Bln U.S. Dollars in 2006” – People‟s Daily Online  
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China‟s major export partners are the following nations: US 21.0%, EU 18.1%, Hong Kong 17.0%, Japan 
12.4%, ASEAN 7.2%, and South Korea 4.7%.  On the import side, the major partners are: Japan 16.8%, EU 12.4%, 
ASEAN 11.2%, South Korea 11.1%, US 7.9%, and Russia 2.2%.
11
  
 
 
 
 
 
Analyses of the trade balance for the recent period (2000-2005) indicates a growing surplus and inflow from 
the goods and services transactions.  An increasingly growing surplus indicates that the Chinese economy is still 
highly competitive externally.  Everything else constant, this would increase demand for the Renminbi and cause its 
price to appreciate vis-a-vi other currencies.  
 
Analyzing further current account components, we can see a similar growing trend. Nevertheless, the growth 
in this category is slower and was in slight decline in 2003.  This suggests that some of the large surpluses in the trade 
balance might have been offset by deficit/outflow of income and/or transfer components of the current account.  The 
table above shows that net investment income component is particularly impacted here since there is a high volume of 
FDI and portfolio inestment in China that caused cetrtain repartriation of the profits related to these activities.  
 
On the capital side, we can see that China has achieved consistent and rapidly growing surplus and net inflow 
in this account.  This means that the net amount of FDI, portfolio investments, and other investments in China had 
overcome the Chinese investments abroad. This net capital inflow in China would put additional pressure for the 
Renimbi to appreciate vis-a-vi other currencies, assuming everything else constant. 
 
Based on the analysis of the two major components of Chinese BOP, the conclusion is that the two accounts do not 
balance.  The natural consequence of this situation was a substantial increase in the foreign currency reserves that 
China had obtained.  China had a net inflow and surplus in both of the major BOPs accounts, indicating an increased 
demand for both Chinese goods and services, along with capital and financial assets.  Since China had a fixed 
                                                 
11 “Economy of the People‟s Republic of China” – Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia  
Balance of Payment 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Current Account 
(US dollars-millions) 
Foreign Balance on Goods and Services 
(US dollars-millions) 
Foreign Net Investment Income 
(US dollars-millions) 
Foreign Net Current Transfers 
(US dollars-millions) 
Capital & Financial Account 
(US dollars-millions) 
Net Errors & Omissions 
(US dollars-millions) 
Overall Balance 
(US dollars-millions) 
Official Foreign Currency Reserves 
(US dollars-millions) 
Current Account (Percent of GDP) 
(percent) 
614.5 
0.019 0.0146 0.0272 0.0312 0.023 
168.278 215.605 291.128 408.151 
12.745 
10,693.00 47,447.00 75,217.00 116,586.00 n/a 
-11.748 -4.732 7.504 17.985 
20.01 
1.923 34.88 32.291 52.82 42.51 
6.311 8.492 12.984 17.634 
n/a 
-14.666 -19.175 -14.945 -7.838 n/a 
28.874 28.084 37.383 36.079 
20.519 17.401 35.422 45.875 38.256 
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exchange rate regime, its Central Bank had to interviene and maintain this exchange rate by selling Renminbi based 
on increased demand for it.  Increased demand for Chinese assets, products, and services put pressure on the Renminbi 
and forced the Chinese government to sell its currency, thus increasing its foreign currency reserves.  This situation 
lead to a worldwide debate of the need for China to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy and let the Renminbi 
adequately reflect movements in balance of paymets accounts, effectively bringing its reserves on a more appropriate 
level.  
 
INFLATION IN CHINA  
 
 
Prices and Exchange Rates
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Consumer Prices
(Index - 1995 = 100)
Inflation Rate (% Growth in Consumer Prices)
(percent)
Exchange Rate Currency per $US (Average)
(yuan / $US)
Exchange Rate Annual % Growth
(percent)
8.276
n/a -0.0169 -0.0012 0 -0.006
8.278 8.277 8.277 8.277
5.3
n/a 66.667 -260 -250 341.667
0.3 0.5 -0.8 1.2
 
Source: Country Watch 
 
 
Period 1986-1997 1997-2006 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Inflation - Consumer prices 11.9 1.3 2.8 -0.8 -1.4 0.4 0.7 -0.8 1.2 3.9 3  
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, September 2005 
 
 
Historical analysis of inflation rates in China measured through the increase of consumer prices indicates 
increased stability in price levels in the last decade.  The analysis reveals that China may even have had certain 
deflationary pressures in 1998, 1999, and 2002.  The deflationary pressures and low inflation in this period can 
indicate increased productivity in the Chinese economy that was consistent with GDP growth achieved in these years. 
However, if we look at the GDP growth in this period we can notice a slight decline in China‟s numbers as well.  This 
downturn was affected by the consequences of the Asian currency crises and the initiation of the slight worldwide 
recession in the beginning of the new century.  Another reason for deflationary pressures can be found in relatively 
lower consumptions in China in this period with a higher propensity to save.  This was also supported by the 
extremely tight fiscal policy of the Chinese government who set price stability as one of their absolute priorities. 
  
From the standpoint of the exchange rate impact, it is obvious that China had generally lower inflation than 
the U.S. in this period.  Everything else constant, this would result in an appreciation of the Chinese Renminbi if it 
would be left to float.  However, in this period, the Chinese government maintained control over its currency.  The 
exchange rates remained pretty much on the same level.  
 
We can further see that in 2004 and 2005 consumer prices in China significantly grew, which can indicate 
stronger economic growth, increased consumer spending, and confidence.  U.S. inflation rates in 2004 were lower 
(2.4%), which would have resulted in the appreciation of the USD, everything else constant.  However, we can see 
that in 2004, the RMB appreciated slightly, indicating that factors other than the respective inflation rates contributed 
to this trend.  In 2005, the Chinese government changed its exchange rate policy by pegging its currency to a basket of 
currencies.  We can observe that in this inflationary period, China declined (lower than in the U.S.) and that the 
Renminbi slightly appreciated vis-a-vi all three basket currencies, which is to some extent, consistent with inflationary 
movements (in the U.S. case). 
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For the purpose of exchange rate analyses and the Chinese ability to maintain a fixed exchange rate, it is 
important to note that China was able to maintain price stability, ultimately keeping a control on inflation.  There are 
no major signs of instability in the short term since China keeps transferring its growing reserves overseas (mostly 
into U.S. securities) instead of increasing its domestic consumption, which can cause inflationary pressures, 
particularly in combination with high GDP growth rates.  In the long term, there is a threat of inflationary pressures 
with the higher growth of the Chinese economy, resulting in a potential “overheating”.  This can be the result of 
increased domestic incomes and eventually higher consumption.  Nevertheless, since statistical data shows a 
significant part of the Chinese population lives below the poverty line, the inflation caused by increased income is no 
immediate threat.      
 
INTEREST RATES IN CHINA 
 
Chinese Central Bank interest rates were higher in the period ranging 2000-2005 than those in the U.S. and 
Japan.  However, the Chinese currency market cannot be considered efficient; hence, the International Fisher Effect is 
unable to accurately predict future spot rates through forward rates.  If we observe exchange rate movements for this 
period, we cannot see consistency that would correspond with the International Fisher Effect.  Besides this, it is 
important to look at the economic structure of China in order to analyze the impact of the interest rates on the 
currency.  The manufacturing oriented sector in China is a major driver of economic development.  An increase in 
interest rates can increase the expenses of businesses that fund operations with debt.  Everything else constant, this 
would lead to inflation and further pressuring for the Renminbi to be devalued in a fixed exchange rate policy regime.   
 
Yet, most of the Chinese growth is coming from abroad in the form of FDIs and external capital inflows that 
are relatively cheaper.  At the same time, there are more financial and borrowing institutions emerging in the Chinese 
markets, which can also be impacted by the Central Bank‟s interest rates policies.  Thus, there are many offsetting 
components in the analysis of the interest rate‟s impact on the RMB.  Analyses suggest that the impact of interest rate 
movements on the Renminbi is secondary due to the mostly fixed exchange rate of its currency and the stronger 
effects of some other components, such as the balance of payment effects.  The tables below show some historical 
interest rates and comparative data with the US and Japan. 
 
 
Interest rates 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Total Interest Rate Amount 1
(bank rate)
Interest Rate Number 2
(lending rate)
Foreign Exchange Reserves
(millions of US dollars) 614.5168.278 215.605 291.128 408.151
3.33
5.85 5.85 5.31 5.31 5.58
3.24 3.24 2.7 2.7
 
Source: Country Watch 
 
 
Interest Rates       
 12.31.00 12.31.01 12.31.02 12.31.03 12.31.04 12.31.05 12.31.06 
U.S. 6.5 1.75 1.25 1 2.25 4.25 5.25 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank of Japan 
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UNEMPLOYMENT IN CHINA 
 
Based on official statistics that are based on urban areas, the conclusion would be that China has relatively 
acceptable levels of unemployment.  Below are official statistics that indicate unemployment rates in urban areas. 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Unemployment Rate % 3.1 3.6 4 3.1 3.1  
Source: Country Watch 
 
 
Nevertheless, research performed by the CIA reveals a different picture.  The CIA fact book database reveals 
that there was an estimated 4.2% official registered for unemployment in urban areas in 2005.  Although 
unemployment is not directly correlated with exchange rates, it can affect them indirectly through social imbalances 
within the economy and the supply of cheap labor that further affects the trade balance and other components of the 
balance of payments.  The high percentage of unemployed people will still present the potential for cheap labor and 
will be the source for the Chinese relative competitive advantage, everything else constant.  This can further affect an 
increase in the Chinese trade surplus and inflow of foreign investments that will put pressures on the RMB to 
appreciate.  However, in conjunction with unbalanced regional growth, higher unemployment might cause social and 
political problems in the future that can negatively impact economic growth consequently reversing the whole 
process.  This impact might even be stronger with further privatization of the remaining state owned enterprises with 
high labor redundancy rates. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
 
China is a politically totalitarian, communist society with the communist party as the leading force.  In 
political terms, China is still a closed, one party society with limited individual rights and freedoms.  On the other 
hand, China launched intensive economic reforms in the late 1970‟s by deregulating its economy and opening it up for 
free trade and foreign investments.  The gradual economic reforms resulted in rapid economic growth in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, establishing China as the second largest economy in the world (measured in real 
GDP terms based on PPP measurements).  Thus, China tries to balance a rigid and authoritarian political system with 
a more open, liberal economy.  This unique mix has so far shown positive results in the economic realm. 
  
Nevertheless, the shift toward a market economy and a focus on being competitive has its price.  This process 
created an uneven distribution of growth benefits throughout the country, which resulted in a large poverty population 
that can be a political liability and threat for the government in the future.  With further liberalization of the Chinese 
economy and its participation in WTO and other organizations, there are more incentives for local and foreign 
investors to intensify their activities that will ultimately increase the pressure on remaining state owned enterprises 
who will be unable to compete because of systematic inefficiencies. At the same time, these enterprises still represent 
the source of employment for this highly populous country.  This all together can further increase a gap between 
China‟s social discrepancies, leading to higher unemployment.  The major challenge for the government in the next 
period will be how to maintain sustainable economic growth while keeping social and political tensions under control.  
Another concern is a more open Chinese economic society that will be able to experience a more liberal political 
system that will provide more rights, individual freedoms, and opportunities for the population.  The result of this can 
be further pressure on the Chinese communist party to start liberalizing the Chinese political system by introducing a 
parliamentary democracy.  
 
In order to prevent the negative consequences of eventual political fallout, the Chinese government 
developed plans for stimulating growth of undeveloped areas and those with poorer populations.  The ultimate result 
of these activities remains left to be seen.  If the Chinese Government succeeds in these intentions and maintains 
political and social stability, and if it simultaneously continues to reform its economy by fostering competitiveness, 
there is an optimistic outlook for further economic growth in China.  That growth would continue to be driven by the 
strong surplus in trade with additional inflows of foreign investments. On the other hand, a more open economy 
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coupled with higher disposable incomes of the Chinese population will generally lead to more of an evenhanded 
balance of payment, calling for a need to introduce more flexibility into its exchange rate policy.  According to the 
theory of “Attributes of Ideal Currency”, China will eventually have to abandon its absolute exchange rate stability if 
it desires full financial integration and continuous inflow of investments and export of goods.       
 
However, there is an intensive and ongoing debate in expert circles on a global level whether this huge 
surplus in Chinese reserves and fixed exchange rate policy is positive for China‟s future growth.  In addition, with 
China becoming one of the largest global players in trade and investments, the issue of its currency exceeds internal 
relevance of this issue or even its bilateral relevance.  For example, the U.S. pressures for China to appreciate its 
currency by letting it float.  This becomes an issue of global importance.   
 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST A RENMINBI FLOAT 
 
Research suggests that there are conflicting arguments regarding the Chinese foreign exchange policy.  
Before presenting in details these somewhat conflicting arguments, it would be beneficial to summarize the following: 
 
 China is still one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The size of its GDP and market, along with 
their volume of international transactions, makes China a global player. 
 China is continuously achieving a surplus in both their current account and their financial account that results 
in an increasing amount of foreign exchange reserves. 
 China is still exercising a high degree of direct control over its currency in order to further promote 
competitiveness of its export. 
 China has made stability over its currency and the prevention of inflation the highest priorities of its 
monetary and economic policies. 
 China has a very conservative fiscal policy in order to prevent inflation. 
 China is increasingly opening its economy by relaxing barriers for foreign investments, planning to further 
privatize its economy. 
 China has a large disproportion in its economic development and a large portion of its population below the 
poverty line. 
 China is still a politically totalitarian society with limited human rights and inadequate legislature. 
 
Arguments In Favor Of Preserving A Mostly Fixed Exchange Rate For The Renminbi 
 
Undeveloped Financial and Banking Sector 
 
China is still not ready for a floating regime. The arguments presented by Sebastian Edwards in the Financial 
Times from August 3 2003 indicated that although floating exchange rates are appropriate for middle and high-income 
countries, they tend to be highly volatile and destabilising in countries with underdeveloped domestic financial 
market, especially in those with weak banking sectors.  Since China shares both of these characteristics plus the lack 
of proper hedging instruments, local companies would be exposed to exchange rate risk.  The already financially 
troubled state-owned enterprise sector might collapse as well. 
 
The Existing Exchange Rate System Worked Well; Fix the External Imbalance by Completely Opening Its Markets 
 
 China should not change the exchange rate system that worked well but would rather need to tackle its 
external imbalance by opening more of its large domestic markets to international competition.  The same article 
states that opening up the economy to trade would generate a welcome surge in Chinese imports from the rest of the 
world.  As imports increase, the trade surplus would be reduced, and the upward pressure on the currency would 
subside.  Another impact of this would be that once it became clear that China would not succumb to the demands that 
it float the Renminbi, hot money inflows would slow down and the accumulation of international reserves would 
decline.  
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Renminbi Stability is Critical for the Economic Development of Asia 
 
The Pacific region along with several Chinese government officials claim that Renminbi stability serves 
China‟s economic performance and conforms to the requirements of the economic development of the Asia-Pacific 
region and the entire world.  Chinese officials stated that trade deficits of some of the largest of China‟s partners (for 
instance the U.S.) are caused by structural problems and fiscal deficits.  In addition, floating can cause a potential 
collapse of highly indebted and still unreformed Chinese banking sector that can further cause a “domino effect” in 
Asia.  Certain international economists who point out that U.S. job loss is not caused by an undervalued Chinese 
currency and warn that such a move could have major consequences for the international financial system.  Morgan 
Stanley‟s chief economist Stephen Roach stated that one of the biggest fears is that a float would set off a series of 
collapses in the highly indebted Chinese banking system.  Furthermore, it is estimated that not even a 30 percent 
revaluation of the yuan would assist U.S. manufacturers, while adversely affecting U.S. firms with large investments 
in China.  Further he stated that Chinese factory sector has become a critical ingredient in the global supply chain.  
 
Arguments For Letting The Renminbi Float 
 
Limited Independence of China’s Monetary Policy 
 
This hampers macroeconomic stability and limits Chinese internal economic balance. Renminbi 
undervaluation has contributed to growing trade surpluses and, in some years, to huge portfolio capital inflows. The 
country‟s Central Bank not only sterilized much of the resulting reserve accumulation but also resorted to 
administrative controls, limiting bank credit creation.  When the Central Bank specifies lending ceilings and sectoral 
lending priorities, it slows development of a bank‟s credit culture, setting back another top policy objective12.  
 
Undervalued Renminbi Increases Global Imbalances 
 
China‟s inflexible, undervalued currency also drags on the adjustment of global imbalances and increases the 
risk of a hard landing for the dollar and the U.S. economy with adverse global spillover effects.  This huge imbalance 
will put additional pressure on the dollar to depreciate and U.S. domestic demand to grow more slowly than domestic 
output (and the reverse in the rest of the world). 
 
Open Economic Systems Require More Reliance on Market Forces 
 
China has become an increasingly market oriented economy.  The consequence of this is that the Chinese 
government cannot fix exchange rates, interests rates, and inflation rates at the same time.  If exchange rates are fixed, 
there is little incentive for Chinese interest rates to differ from those in the U.S.  If this is the relationship, then price 
levels are of residual value and cannot be fixed. 
 
Political Pressures From Major Trading Partners 
 
Political pressures from most major trading partners (including China‟s neighboring Japan and Korea who 
did significant realignment of their currencies) are mounting on China to align and appreciate its currency vis-à-vis 
their own.  Another problem related to this is that with the opening up of the Chinese economy, this balance cannot 
last forever and sooner or later some significant appreciation is expected.  This situation attracts large amounts of “hot 
money” in China, both internally and externally.  Once significant appreciation happens, this “hot money movement” 
can create large disturbances in China, both internally and globally.  
 
 
 
                                                 
12 “A New Way to Deal with the Renminbi”.  Morris Goldstein & Nicholas R. Lardy, Institute for International Economics. Op-ed 
in the Financial Times. January 20, 2006  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the analyses of Chinese macroeconomic fundamentals, its political framework, and arguments for 
and against the Renminbi floating, the first conclusion is that the Renminbi exchange rate regime became more global 
than just an internal issue.  The Renminbi regime was the subject of major debate that attracted serious attention of the 
global public and particularly of the major Chinese trading partners.  There are valid arguments in favor of both fixed 
and floating exchange rates, but neither of these extremes looks to be an optimal solution for China‟s internal 
problems, nor for its external disequilibria.  Most likely, the solution should be found in a policy that lies in between 
these extreme points. 
  
Specifically, China is not ready to completely float the Renminbi.  Deficiencies in the banking sector, 
undeveloped financial markets, and an incomplete privatization process (still large number of government subsidized 
local enterprises) are suggesting that China is still in a transition process and overall is a fragile economy.  In this 
situation, floating the Renminbi would create high internal disturbances in China that would further affect the global 
economy, being that China is one of the largest trading nations and recipients of FDI.  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese government will have to let something go in order to become a globally 
integrated market economy.  It is not possible that they can fix and control all financial and macroeconomic indicators 
and still be an integral part of the global economy in the long run.  Due to political and economic pressures (the law of 
supply and demand), China has to make certain adjustments in its Renminbi value.  The best way to make this 
adjustment would be to revalue its currency relative to a basket (10% for example), and then gradually let the 
Renminbi appreciate without letting it float.  The initial step of increasing the Renminbi‟s value can be done by 
announcing an official revaluation or by letting market forces appreciate the Renminbi relative to world currencies.  
By doing this, China would release political pressures
13
 and show that it is serious about fixing its external imbalance, 
but it would also increase its monetary independence and start gaining experience in managing increased flexibility 
that will be required in the long run.  
 
Nevertheless, this measure will not be successful if it is not combined with other economic policies geared 
toward solving the Chinese internal gap in income distribution and in regional development.  In addition, China has to 
intensively pursue the transformation of non-efficient, state owned enterprises into private, competing entities, along 
with creating a stable and market oriented banking system.  In order to achieve these goals, China should more 
actively utilize its fiscal policy by increasing spending in order to decrease the amount of population below the 
poverty level, developing internal capabilities (currently most of the Chinese export comes from MNEs operating in 
China).   
 
In order to do that, the Chinese government should invest in education, particularly in the poorest areas, by 
developing programs for supporting entrepreneurship and small and medium sized enterprises (SME‟s).  This is one  
way to deal with the further increase of redundant labor that will emerge as a consequence of continued privatization.  
Another benefit would be that China would utilize its large monetary reserves for solving internal economic and 
political problems, rather than just investing them in U.S. securities, further increasing an imbalance.  A potential 
negative impact of these measures is inflationary pressure at some point, but increased inflation is a natural 
consequence of the higher growth, higher incomes, and reduced unemployment.  With intensive opening of its 
economy, China will have to build capabilities to utilize monetary and fiscal policies and keep macroeconomic 
indicators in balance.       
 
In conclusion, China would need to gradually prepare itself to float the Renminbi at some point in the future, 
but this should not be done before a strong banking system and financial markets are built.  China also needs to start 
solving issues regarding uneven economic development thought their country.  However, China will also have to be 
                                                 
13 “In particular, manufacturing executives worry that unless China loosens its grip on the yuan and complies with international 
trade agreements, U.S. lawmakers will try to impose punitive measures that could limit access and trade. In the past few months, 
the Chinese have been allowing the yuan to rise against the dollar and the currency is now 5.7% stronger than it was in July 2005, 
when authorities initially allowed it to move. But that pace isn't fast enough to satisfy some critics.” – „Paulson Tempers 
Expectations for China visit‟, Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2006 
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more serious in sending some stronger signals that it is ready to play by market rules (fair game) if it wants to 
contribute to harmonizing the global economy.  Thus, a certain initial revaluation of the Renminbi has to take place 
soon.  Another concern that should not be neglected is China‟s ability to preserve its political system in the long run as 
the country is developing into more of an open and globally integrated state.  The intensity and dynamics of the 
changes in this area will have a major impact on economic and political stability not only in China, but also the world.    
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